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Introduction
This paper is based on the methodology 
of heterology, inherent to contemporary con-
tinental philosophy and social sciences. The 
reference to heterology entails a radical trans-
formation of social ontology. This transforma-
tion is twofold: firstly, ontology transforms into 
ontogenesis, studying the becoming of various 
systems and phenomena; secondly, ontology 
transforms into heterogenesis, studying the be-
coming as the development of difference, plu-
rality and multiplicity (Kerimov, 2012: 83). In 
a heterological sense, becoming always implies 
the development of difference and multiplicity. 
The problem that arises is how multiplicity, be-
ing heterogeneous, nevertheless organises and 
reproduces itself in the variable social order. 
The convergence of social relations and 
its machinic organisation, developing by the 
post-operaist movement within the theory of 
General Intellect have become a central point 
of many recent discussions. The notion was 
prompted by K. Marx as he observed ma-
chine-aided labour organisation: labour organ-
isation properties represent, in fact, a kind of a 
social “machine”. According to A. Negri, “The 
general intellect is a machinic productive force, 
constituted by the multitude of corporeal sin-
gularities that form the topos of the common 
event of the general intellect. With the genera-
tion of the general intellect, we enter the epoch 
of the man-machine” (Negri, 2003: 205–206). 
Since communication has a multiple nature, the 
creative productivity of the General Intellect is 
expected to overcome the limitations imposed 
by the capital and grant the society a politi-
cal and economic freedom (Lazzarato, Negri, 
1991; Virno, 2004). It is important to clarify 
that General Intellect is also a virtual body or 
a machine, topologically composed by social 
connections produced “by the multitude of 
corporeal singularities”. With this virtual body 
being a “social brain” (Wolfe, 2010: 366–374), 
it is not only its implicit creative capacity we 
are interested in but the particular form of the 
structure it is organized through. 
As the initial metaphor for General Intel-
lect was based on a comparison of machinic 
organisation of labour to the knowledge of a 
human mind materially produced by brain, we 
may extend it and use the notion of heterarchy 
originated in the early artificial neural network 
theories to define both the connection structure 
and the value formation principles. Despite its 
heuristic value, the concept of heterarchy is not 
clearly defined and is not frequently used. The 
main commentary was provided by W.S. Mc-
Culloch (McCulloch, 1945: 89–93), the author 
of the first theoretical artificial neural network 
model, in his brain neurones research. McCull-
och associated the heterarchy of values with the 
concept of the whole, different parts of which 
tie together every single whole and contribute 
to its changes. 
Concerning our research, heterarchy is 
a multitude of hierarchies connected by net-
works, thus composing aggregations of actors 
and relations. This structure is heterogeneous, 
which means that actors and relations are exte-
rior to each other. For such a property of het-
erarchical relations, we use the term of exteri-
ority as applied by M. Delanda to the analysis 
of multiplicity and social complexity (Delanda, 
2006: 8). According to Delanda, exterior re-
lations form the objects through assemblage, 
i.e. a process of cross-connecting relations, 
and heterarchy is a form of structure emerging 
through such a cross-connection.
We argue that being a structure of General 
Intellect, heterarchy may clarify its composi-
tion and properties as general for the society 
and its capacity to be intellect. Without this, 
General Intellect remains nothing but a beau-
tiful metaphor. Further, with the help of the 
heterarchy concept, we will show that though 
General Intellect may denote capacity for 
self-organisation of society as an aggregate, it 
is difficult to identify with the only particular 
institutional organisation or political regime. 
General Intellect appears in any type of social 
structuring through self-organising processes.
Ontology of Multitude:  
Connection Structure as a Process
First of all, we need to analyse ontology of 
multitude as a domain of social cognition and 
organisation to find how multiple relations may 
ontologically form social orders. Negri writes: 
“In contrast with the concept of the people, the 
concept of multitude is a singular multiplicity, 
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a concrete universal. The people constitute a 
social body; the multitude does not, because 
the multitude is the flesh of life. …the multi-
tude is an active social agent, a multiplicity that 
acts. Unlike the people, the multitude is not 
a unity, but as opposed to the masses and the 
plebs, we can see it as something organised. In 
fact, it is an active agent of self-organisation” 
(Negri, 2002: 36). This kind of organisation 
has no centre, no exact border (an ontological 
“apartheid” between more and less real enti-
ties) or aim. Here Negri advocates Deleuzian 
understanding of multiplicity. 
There are two fundamental aspects of 
multiplicity that should be highlighted here: 
firstly, its elements are virtual, and secondly, 
their mutual differential relations, correspond-
ing to singularities, determine this virtuality, 
or potentiality. There is an opportunity for 
the differential ontology of multiplicities, one 
dealing with the virtual transforming into the 
actual. This ontology is incompatible with the 
concepts of the One and the Many: a multi-
plicity, in contrast to plurality, excludes any 
unitary instance. Ontologically, as pointed 
out by Deleuze and Guattari, parts and whole 
are the same, since parts may form many dif-
ferent wholes of the same relations (Deleuze, 
Guattari, 2000: 42–50). Since every movement 
causes a transformation of the whole, the whole 
as such should always be open. In other words, 
it is impossible to identify the whole with a 
kind of integrity or closeness of the system. If 
the whole is not the one, the reason is its being 
open and continually changing or contributing 
to the emergence of something new; in a word, 
becoming. 
Here we are dealing with a dynamic struc-
ture which is always in the process of becom-
ing. This structure is relational, as multitude is 
singular, related to the one and the many. How-
ever, how may social order(s) emerge? Negri 
states: “…Multitude is an ensemble of singu-
larities whose life-tool is the brain and whose 
productive force consists in co-operation. In 
other words, if the singularities that constitute 
the multitude are plural, the manner in which 
they enter into relations is co-operative. How 
can the plurality and the co-operation of singu-
larities express governance of the common, in 
so far as they form the constitutive power of the 
world? Within the teleology of the common…
ontological transformation frees us from sover-
eignty” (Negri, 2003: 225–226). 
Whereas the relations between the one and 
the many are determined by being (static ontol-
ogy of unity), the relations between common 
and singularity are determined by becoming, 
that is, an ontology of multitude. The co-oper-
ation of singularities within the common pro-
duces new relations (or singularities) which, 
in turn, feed back into the (newly constituted) 
common engaging itself into co-operation with 
(newly modified) singularities, and so on. It 
is in this sense that co-operation of singular-
ities in the common is produced and produc-
ing. Dynamic social structure is driven by the 
“teleology of common” where the common is 
a name for cooperation. It is here the first con-
troversy arises. Negri writes that the common 
(which is a “living labour”) is singular, differ-
ently affecting each member of the multitude 
(Negri, 2003: 182). Ironically, this means that 
the common, as well as the cooperation, does 
not belong to the multitude, so the common is 
simply not common, but the exterior, i.e., not 
only shared but also divided. The commonality 
of the common is formal, providing different 
actors with different fruits of labour. There-
fore, it is difficult for the common to unify a 
plurality by imposing a teleology of common 
cooperation. If we wish to have a dynamic, 
singular structure of relations, which is in con-
tinuous motion of self-organisation without a 
command centre, we would suggest that the 
order (as the constitution of the whole) is re-
cursive and comes from the exterior. Literally, 
this means that order comes from other people 
as individuals and groups (singularities), being 
plural and impossible to be completely subju-
gated to any kind of goal, including the goal of 
common cooperation. The latter is a multiple 
process organised from all aspects of the issue, 
which makes teleology impossible. 
Heterarchy may provide an interpretation 
of structure as a multiple order designed from 
the exterior, without unifying the common 
as transcendent grounding or transcendental 
pre-supposition of the structure. Heterarchy 
holds the whole and its parts as immanent mul-
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tiple entities with different meanings depend-
ing on the environment and recursively com-
bining different wholes co-existing together. 
No parts are exclusively predisposed to consti-
tuting a whole, and no whole is a transcendent 
grounding, exclusive goal or meaning for any 
organised parts, because each of them emerg-
es simultaneously. Otherness, or exteriority, is 
extremely important here, as it would be not 
enough to say that heterarchy is just a multiple 
structure. For such a case, it could be a polyar-
chy or a network, and would not need inventing 
a new concept. 
Heterarchy reflects the fact that relations 
and their meanings are not only multiple; they 
are also singular, i.e. have endless ways of em-
bodiment. This means that the same relation 
for a particular group or an individual may 
contain many different meanings, and link 
these people to another group, organising an 
automatic causation process. Statistical multi-
tudes emerge in a relational activity of some in-
dividuals. And as they emerge, not guided, the 
structuration process begins from the outside 
for any part and the whole of relations, evoking 
diverse meanings and agencies tied without the 
“common” intention. The forbiddance of tran-
sitivity proposed by McCulloch is the condition 
that explains how the exterior whole and parts 
may avoid a vicious circle of the teleology of 
common cooperation. It means that no particu-
lar relation or meaning can be taken as univer-
sal. Any composition of relations appears local, 
and a multiplicity of relations is topological. 
The more valuable are the relations, the more 
frequent and dense connections between them 
are made, the faster is the social time, the more 
complex is the social space and vice versa. 
This is not surprising if we remember that 
neuron connections in the brain are structured 
in the same manner, i.e. the more frequent is the 
act (and the corresponding signals), the more 
dense neuron connections are formed. Negri 
reminds that “If we wish to give to the common 
name the direction of the arrow of time and 
place it in relation to its irreversibility without 
losing its singularity, it is necessary then that 
the common name is grasped as an act or prax-
is of temporality” (Negri, 2003: 160). There-
fore, heterarchical relations take place in real 
time and imply process as their constitutive as-
pect. This proposition leads us to a paradox of a 
structure that appears as a process. Though the 
notion of structure is usually associated with 
stability and rigidity of order, here we have an 
order emerging through overlapping relations 
and different sequences of relations that give 
rise to different orders structured by the same 
heterarchical principle. In turn, if forbiddance 
of transitivity leads to the emergence of a pro-
cessual structure, this structure is nothing but 
an embodied experience, or history of an ob-
ject’s becoming and its path dependency. This 
statement may be further articulated as an ex-
perience of irreversible time is the absolute re-
quirement for the structuration of relations in a 
multiple environment. 
How is it possible for the parts to be equal-
ly significant to the whole and for the order to 
come from the process but not an initial inten-
tion or idea? A solution was suggested by G. 
Tarde who described a model of multiple social 
relations without an initial intention, i.e. with-
out a rational goal imposed on individuals or 
groups. Tarde called this process an imitation, 
which produces subjectivities through simi-
larity and difference of partial and common 
attributes: individuals reflect features of their 
groups, just as groups are organised as com-
positions of the individuals’ attributes, and not 
as subjects representing a social whole (Tar-
de, 1903: 37–43). Abstractly, these singular 
objects, organised by relations without inten-
tions, may be referred to as fractals. Omitting 
the mathematical definition of fractals, it can 
be said that social fractality is an undeniable 
full or partial similitude of relations. Fractal-
ity reflects the above-mentioned properties of 
recursiveness of the whole and its parts, with 
the meaning of relation dependant on the in-
teraction and creation of different orders and 
structures through a process. Being fractals, 
they are constituted by the mimesis of the 
wholes and their parts through difference and 
repetition. In other words, the source of social 
diversity is at the same time the source of or-
der. Social relations are not only singular; they 
are also typical and differ by various patterns 
of organisation, coordinated by the processes 
of relations themselves through association in 
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irreversible time. The organisation of society 
implies reproduction and change of the assem-
bling localities, and the virtual heterarchical 
structure is the order for the temporal sequence 
of topological allocation of social relations.
Since individuals and groups, as Negri 
asserts, become singularities i.e. relational ob-
jects, they cannot be completely identified with 
a particular attribute, rationality, profession, 
ethnicity, etc. Identifications become proces-
sual, and reproduction of new attributes means 
their recursiveness in the networks of singular-
ities. Overlapping networks of relations pro-
duce recursive hierarchies that emerge on mul-
tiple associations of singularities. Multiplicity, 
therefore, is the origin of hierarchy as well of 
the network. Multiple networks accompany hi-
erarchies and recursive hierarchies accompany 
networks. Aggregations of singularities repro-
duce themselves through simulation of unity 
in a fractal way as a similitude of the diverse. 
Such a quality acquired by singularities may be 
usually observed in small groups where a group 
submits its members. As Delanda shows in his 
social complexity theory, at the macro scale we 
may see the properties of the unique individu-
als, taken in statistical aggregations and spread 
in time and space, appear as the collective ones, 
aimed toward the goals that individuals are not 
aware of. Yet, being statistical sets, general sin-
gularities continue to be individual ones with 
their own path in time and a place in space of 
relations (Delanda, 2006: 16–18). Whether it is 
a group, a community, or a nation, any collec-
tivities that detect their identifications post-fac-
tum, are examples of this process. 
Therefore, we may say that the establish-
ment of any singular network is pre-supposed 
by a hierarchy of aggregation as a whole and 
vice versa, a hierarchy is pre-supposed by net-
works. Relations remain multiple in networks 
but localized by matching hierarchies. Any 
hierarchy is aggregated by overlapping neigh-
bouring networks of singularities and its de-
scription will therefore always imply connec-
tions and meanings of contiguous entities. It 
is a singular actor of networks and an element 
of hierarchies, thus combining the macro and 
micro scales of relations. Singularities actual-
ize interactions to the extent to which they are 
elements of a more general hierarchy and a rel-
evant order other than themselves. Relations of 
singularities are not based on the only hierar-
chy or network; they involve relationships with 
other hierarchies of more general and local or-
ders, as well as relationships with contiguous 
networks. As a result, elements of two different 
hierarchies can interact only within the bound-
aries of a third, partially common or differen-
tiated hierarchy. A network from one hierarchy 
cannot be moved into the space of another or 
establish an equal relationship with it. In a 
manner of speaking, hierarchies multiply in the 
process of network differentiation. That is why 
social relations tend to be conservative, whilst 
the elements of one hierarchy remain passive 
in their relations with elements from other hi-
erarchies. 
Nevertheless, networks of singularities, 
but not hierarchies of identities, prove to be 
a tool for the multiplication of ordered sys-
tems. By singular nature of the social, activity 
spreads through mobile networks, making it 
impossible for a heterarchy (as a social connec-
tion structure) to subjugate to a particular in-
stitutional order (Krasavin, 2017: 138). All this 
considered, social relations are network-form-
ing hierarchies, heterarchical organisation of 
which automatically emerge on the activity 
of singularities. Such relational assemblage 
is metastable, so the positions of singularities 
in a connection structure, the forms of their 
subjectivity and the forms of their activity are 
mutually dependent. Their connections line up 
through the topological distribution and the 
temporal irreversibility of ties. Time is irre-
versible, but relations are reversible. Types of 
relations are finite, but the variety of situations 
is infinite.
Transformations  
of Multitude and General Intellect
The connection structure proposed above 
should help us to clarify whether metaphys-
ics of the ‘common’ of multitude described in 
(post)operaismo may form General Intellect 
acting as a means of liberation from the shack-
les of capitalism. For this purpose, we have to 
analyse the social order-determining capacity 
of the organisation of multitude and Gener-
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al Intellect, keeping in mind the properties of 
heterarchy described above. The multitude is 
the main concept of General Intellect theory as 
the only visible, material part of general cog-
nition. Borrowed by A. Negri from A. Math-
eron, it means a decentralized organisation of 
relations, representing the process of associa-
tion that forms social groups from the sets of 
individuals (Matheron, 1988; Negri, 1991: 109, 
140.). The multitude members become singu-
larities, structurally located between the par-
ticular individuals and the general collectivity 
of society. 
Since being promoted by Negri, the notion 
of the multitude has faced various criticisms. P. 
Macherey and E. Laclau found that the hetero-
geneous nature of multitude was the main ob-
stacle for its political use. In their opinion, in-
terpreting multitude as a political body implies 
subjectivity as a general volition towards a cer-
tain goal, which turns society into a single en-
tity. Acting as a political body and making de-
cisions requires unity and a guiding hegemonic 
force to emerge on the initial social multiplic-
ity. This means a miraculous transformation 
of singularities at the moment when a political 
decision is made by some political activists 
united at least by common values of revolution 
or something else (Laclau, 2005: 153). Being 
united, as E. Balibar suggests, the multitude 
becomes ambivalent, since silent obedience is 
at least as frequent as a spontaneous rebellion. 
As multitude lacks ‘internal political criteria’, 
it may equally guide social solidarity both to 
peaceful and aggressive actions (Balibar, 1993: 
3–38). Without any circumlocution, S. Zizek 
and A. Badiou issued a verdict that multitude 
is a political force of domination mirroring 
decentered organisation of the capital (Badi-
ou, 2003: 125; Zizek, 2006: 261–267). In other 
words, the multitude may easily appear to be 
the origin of the capital despotism, as well as 
a democracy may turn out to be an ochlocracy. 
Responding to this criticism, Negri inter-
prets the multitude differently, describing it is 
as a network of whatever actors, ties, values etc. 
In this case, the multitude becomes a kind of 
rhizome (Negri, 2002). Then, interpreting so-
ciety as a multitude means that there are many 
different foundations and forms of sociality 
united only by the fact of their relation to some 
object. The meanings of these relations can be 
different for many actors, and it is enough to 
be considered a part of a social whole. Any-
one is considered a part of the multitude and 
contributes to ‘the primary fount of the valo-
risation of the world’ by intellectual activity. 
Singular multitude continually strives between 
the activities of individual singularities and the 
activities of bigger wholes, general singulari-
ties known as social groups and communities 
(consisting of persons and organisations). The 
flow of becoming singularities makes the mul-
titude an irreversible continuum of relations. 
Irreversibility of multiple relations overcomes 
any institutional restriction. It equally estab-
lishes and destroys ties of individual and gen-
eral singularities. For Negri, this is a hope for 
emancipation, but again, an ontological pres-
ence cannot be equally turned to the political 
order. In other words, irreversibility does not 
aim toward a particular singularity, capitalistic 
or communistic. 
What unites multitude without unifica-
tion is General Intellect; social communication 
that produces subjectivities and knowledge. 
The latter requires another mode of organi-
sation and another type of actor rather than 
singularity or an aggregate. Another type of 
actor is an ego seeking goals and producing 
knowledge; another mode of organisation is a 
hierarchy. As pointed out above, a hierarchy 
emerges through the recursiveness of relations 
in overlapping networks of singularities. Each 
of the social conditions overlaps with others, 
turning the multitude of special features into a 
community of singularities. Besides, hierarchy 
does not only appear to be a means of exterior 
organisation; it is also a mode of interior repro-
duction of singularities. Due to the recursion 
of relations, they can be temporally and finitely 
manipulated for the sake of a common goal. Hi-
erarchy reduces multiplicity to the simulation 
of unity through the coincidence of reasons and 
goals of relations and the point of coincidence 
is hierarchy itself. Therefore, through the delay 
and operation of time, it interiorises the rela-
tions and properties of singularities, and with 
the help of hierarchy, singularities mediate 
processes, assemble ties and synthesise values 
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(senses), i.e. act as goal-seeking egos that are 
different to aggregations.
We may see that aggregate and ego supple-
ment each other, while the latter represents the 
development of the former, though remaining 
exterior. This power of ego is more successful 
when supported by fluctuations of aggregates. 
Ego and any hierarchical institutions are limit-
ed by their finite goals and capacity of volition, 
which, at the macro scale, make them similar to 
aggregates, actuated by repeated relations. That 
is why an irreversible motion of aggregates can 
overcome the power of ego. The process, in 
which ego and aggregate correspond to each 
other, is a “living labour”, or “the common”, 
the multiple and singular that in any particu-
lar case overcome exploitation by a particular 
mode of relations (Negri, 2003: 225–235). 
As a social cognitive capacity, General 
Intellect comes from the living labour, or the 
common, produced by the multitude in the 
form of information and knowledge. Here we 
see that analysis of social relations leaves the 
rigid institutional structures, certain modes of 
production and means of their evaluation be-
hind. “Living” means variability of labour, ab-
sence of strict means for evaluation, i.e. ones to 
be reified in the model of discrete material ob-
jects or institutions. If information and knowl-
edge cannot be ultimately located, they also 
cannot be manipulated through attribution to 
certain properties. They are displaced, remain-
ing at the same place; the one who gives it does 
not lose it. These properties of information and 
knowledge have been known for a long time, 
but our task is to understand the relations that 
produce and organise information and knowl-
edge as the common, into General Intellect as 
a whole.
Though the common cannot be reified, it 
can, nevertheless, be structured in some way. 
Information and knowledge differ from each 
other as they form different objects. As a col-
lection of data, information is an aggregation 
or an aggregative state of knowledge. As such, 
information has only quantitative properties, 
but no qualitative ones. Information becomes 
knowledge when it is attributed to the ego, 
i.e. to the actor with certain goals and actions. 
Therefore, recognition of some data as infor-
mation or as knowledge depends on the actor. 
It would not be exaggerated to say that knowl-
edge defines one’s capacity of having goals and 
consequences of actions, therefore subjectiviz-
ing an actor. Thus, being an aggregate of prop-
erties and qualities, the actor turns into an ego 
with its goal-setting. Of course, we may contin-
ue that every ego is a part of more general ag-
gregates, and some of them (as groups, organ-
isations) also possess some properties of ego. 
Depending on the environment and con-
figuration of ties, individual singularity trans-
forms information to knowledge in different 
ways and uses it differently as well. Informa-
tion also naturally circulates within particular 
communities. Through the organisational hi-
erarchy, community acquires better cognitive 
capacities actualized in goal setting activities. 
This contributes to the concealment of infor-
mation and the growth of knowledge. Acting 
as an ego, as a mediator, an institutionally re-
producing community may exploit the “struc-
tural holes” (Burt, 1992, pp. 30–37) in the so-
cial whole to acquire benefits and power. In its 
turn, power, especially the power of capital, 
excels by governing social ties as aggregates. 
Here we face two sides of operation of aggre-
gates; on the one hand, an opportunity for the 
ego to exploit them means that the inequality 
will be never overcome. On the other hand, 
the lack of total control of aggregates by the 
ego means the inevitable overcoming of any 
totalitarianism, which always remains tempo-
rary and partial. This means that “making a 
multitude” and exploitation of a multitude is 
a process that never comes to an end. General 
Intellect provides opportunities for both sides 
of the issue and may be used equally for liber-
ation and hegemony.
General Intellect, Heterarchy  
and New Forms of Organisation
Let us now examine some opportunities 
and limits of exploiting General Intellect using 
the example of “living labour” management in 
IT companies and the possible threats to soci-
ety. Corporative sociology (after followers of 
Gramsci) has already become aware of cogni-
tive organisation and provided some reasoning 
on the subject. In his research, D. Stark writes 
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about a new kind of managerial organisation 
in terms that are almost indistinguishable 
from the concept of General Intellect given by 
P. Virno (Virno, 2007). This new organisation 
represents an organisational form of a “distrib-
uted intelligence in which units are laterally 
accountable according to diverse principles 
of evaluation” (Stark, 2011: 19). According to 
Stark, this happens in the processes of broker-
age and entrepreneurship among organisations 
when specific individual and hierarchized or-
ganisations mediate the work of other actors 
or include them in their system of relations. 
In other words, one hierarchical organisation, 
which has access to another, can contribute to 
the establishment of a certain joint structure 
of relations. For Stark, this structure presents 
an “organisation of dissonance” making so-
cial complexity work for different accounts of 
worth. For Virno (and Negri definitely would 
agree with this), the differently evaluated “dis-
tributed intelligence” is that very General In-
tellect he associated with emergent variable 
social structure. Surprisingly, the corporate 
management theory inspired by the example of 
Silicon (V)Alley with its typical style of com-
munication between programmers, came to 
the same conclusions as the Italian Operaismo 
thinkers. What is more surprising, the name 
for the new kind of structure given by Stark 
was heterarchy.
Put into practice, this organisation method 
could solve the main problem of social theory, 
the issue of difference between structure and 
action, or, in the context of this paper, between 
action and cognition. Stark proposes to merge 
aggregative social complexity and goal-setting 
activity of ego in an organisational structure. 
However, this technique is just an exception to 
the rules; in social practice, heterarchy (and its 
promising economic prospects in the form of 
distributed intelligence) is hardly susceptible to 
formalization. The irreversibility of time and 
topological distribution of processes, leading to 
the complexity of relations, is the main imped-
iment. Every hierarchic organisation is a kind 
of ego limited by its own goals. A liner merger 
usually interrupts their work. Of course, they 
can establish a kind of mediator, but that organ-
isation, being an ego itself, will also be limited 
by its own finite goals. If it merges the previous 
two organisations and redistributes their tasks 
and results, we will see a hierarchy, not heterar-
chy. The presence of goals and values points at 
the finitude of organisation, subordinated to a 
hierarchical order, whereas a heterarchy, being 
multiple, overcomes particular order through 
establishing many different orders as aggre-
gations of singularities. Different hierarchies 
belong to different situations (localities in the 
heterarchichal space of relations), while their 
connections establish the third situation, which 
is not associated with the targets of the first two 
and so on. This change is endless and hetero-
geneous. 
In the case of relatively small organisa-
tions like start-ups and other forms of petty 
bourgeois business, diverse principles of eval-
uation are possible, but the multitude of petty 
bourgeoisie (usually called market) naturally 
produces large hierarchical organisations that 
sublate original heterogeneity (or operate it in 
the process of project management). Any or-
ganisation exists as overlapping communities, 
i.e. an aggregative multitude and as a recur-
sive hierarchy with finite and perpetuate goals. 
These two contradict each other; indeed, they 
may exploit each other, but they cannot merge. 
Their general intellect does not automatically 
emerge; it sporadically appears in local situa-
tions. 
It is important to remember the other side 
of General Intellect mentioned earlier in this 
article, which is the potential of exploitation 
and control over the society. As Verscellone 
and Pasquinelli already put it, the development 
of IT may increase the surveillance capacity 
of power and capital (Vercellone, 2007, Pas-
quinelli, 2013: 49-68). Any technological in-
novation that eases aggregation of relations in 
the form of data will sooner or later lead to the 
growth of control over the multitude. This will 
happen even if the initial idea of innovation 
was exactly the reverse. The Internet itself is 
one of the best examples of this case. Initiat-
ed as a libertarian community, now it provides 
opportunities for shadowing. The blockchain 
technology that traces all the motions of trans-
actions on the Internet is even a better exam-
ple. Using this innovation, people can control 
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their money and properties and trust each oth-
er, which means that they do not need medi-
ators for their financial operations anymore. 
Does it mean that banking will soon disappear 
and communistic libertarianism will emerge? 
There is a particular technology that makes all 
aspects of this issue possible. It will be used 
not only by private individuals and small en-
terprises; it will be used by big corporations 
to control all the transactions to combine their 
technical and financial power. Acting as egos, 
several supercompanies will compete with the 
multitude of other singularities, and the results 
of this competition cannot be predicted in ad-
vance. As power and capital are exteriorly or-
ganised hierarchies of networks, aggregation 
of these networks of singularities is used not 
only to overcome them but also to help them 
reproduce.
The last thesis about exteriority of pow-
er and capital, however, may clarify the limits 
to which exploitation of General Intellect ex-
tends. Exteriority of power means that it comes 
rather from an agreement of obedient bodies 
than from charisma or special intentions. Of 
course, surveillance gives lots of opportunities 
for control and manipulation of life, knowl-
edge and human communication, but it does 
not mean that the forces of exploitation have a 
programme for our lives and communication. 
Such totalitarian projects have already hap-
pened in recent history and proven to be utopi-
an. Capitalism is survivable precisely because 
of the absence of additional ideology except for 
the simple idea of “buy cheap to sell dear”. It 
serves and exploits any kind of social organi-
sation which accepts any privacy. If mere life 
and human communication become the origins 
of the accumulation of capital and the form of 
institutionalized power, so multiplicity and ex-
teriority of their organisation putting a limit 
to the authoritarianism of power and egoism 
of capital. Total subordination of heterarchi-
cal structure of social ties is impossible, which 
also causes impossibility of subordination of 
the General Intellect that changes in the rela-
tions and choices of singularities. Like heterar-
chy, General Intellect is perceived as a virtual 
entity; can a virtual entity be exploited by the 
powers of domination or liberation? Like het-
erarchy, General Intellect excels any hierarchic 
order with goals, let them be imposed by liber-
ation or exploitation.
As a connection structure, heterarchy re-
veals properties that make opportunities for 
exploitation of General Intellect or using it for 
overcoming capitalism (or any other social or-
der) very limited. General Intellect is seen as 
the development of relations established by ties 
of singularities and, therefore, combines the 
attributes of cogito and conatus. Total subju-
gation of General Intellect to whatever goals is 
impossible for, being an aggregate of a social 
whole, it retroactively affects all the singular-
ities of the multitude. Due to irreversibility of 
time and topological configuration of ties, any 
particular singularity, an aggregate or ego with 
its political or economic goals will always be 
dependent on its location in the connection 
structure. Heterarchy and General Intellect 
provide opportunities for the emergence of ag-
gregation and formation of egos, but no more. 
It does not serve for particular social order as it 
produces all the orders simultaneously. 
As the brain does not suspect of the ego, 
the General Intellect made by social heterarchy 
is not aware of cognitive or any other capital-
ism. Due to the difference between aggregates 
and egos, General Intellect is not ego-centred, 
so it cannot be subjugated though it is partially 
possible to operate its self-organisation. Even 
if General Intellect is assimilated to the assem-
blage of information machines, as Pasquinel-
ly put it, such an exegesis will be insufficient. 
Information machines are organised around 
certain functions and have no ego, i.e. do not 
appear as a species, that makes a decision 
(transforms information to knowledge) on its 
own in the process of irreversible time. If there 
is no common ego – there is no General Intel-
lect seeking particular goals, there is only the 
General Intellect as self-organisation of aggre-
gations of singularities. 
Conclusion
The model of heterarchy provides oppor-
tunities and imposes limitations on social re-
lations and therefore casts light on the extent 
to which the phenomenon of General Intellect 
can be embodied in the virtual structure of 
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social connections and a specific institution-
al organisation. In this case, it is important to 
remember that the introduction of the notion 
of heterarchy by S. McCulloch was directly 
connected with his theoretical artificial neural 
network model in which the transitivity law 
is forbidden. The restriction imposed on the 
law of transitivity proves useful here since 
it prohibits the scaling of any property with-
out alteration of objects or relations. That is, 
it refers to the capacity for thinking as well 
as connection to a social institution. There-
fore, heterarchical structure inevitably im-
plies complexity and increasing multiplicity 
in irreversible time, which the human mind 
and program code constantly face. If General 
Intellect is something more than a metaphor, 
then the restriction of transitivity and uncon-
trollable complexity should become its inher-
ent properties.
A heterarchically-structured society is al-
ways a General Intellect since it organises itself 
in irreversible time through the association of 
heterogeneous relations. Machines and media 
accelerate communication, making it more vis-
ible and partially computable, but they do not 
replace or reproduce it, since they do not see 
it as the reason for existence as people do. Of 
course, the actions of people and organisations 
are limited by their goals and functions but 
unlike machines, they make decisions on their 
own.
The multiple structure of heterarchy pro-
vides society with the experience and auto-
maticity of action but denies its reflection as 
a source of organisation. Some opportunities 
provided by the General Intellect can be used, 
but it cannot be forced to conform to a spe-
cific institutional order. Control and variation 
have the same source: hierarchies of relations 
proliferate in a heterarchy while networks are 
a tool of proliferation. Along with control and 
application methods, the General Intellect 
produces methods of liberation, which come 
laden with new limitations. By destroying 
industrial institutions, network organisation 
has brought new hierarchies of control. This 
process is irreversible and only partially con-
trollable: the processes and composition of to-
pological distribution can vary while self-or-
ganisation of multitude will always remain 
exterior to any social order. 
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Онтология множества и гетерархия общего
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Аннотация. В статье исследуется роль онтологии множества в обосновании гете-
рархической структуры общего. Это обоснование конкретизируется в определении 
ряда понятий и методологических средств теории общего интеллекта, которая раз-
вивается в интеллектуальном движении (пост)операизма. В данной теории общий 
интеллект используется для обозначения когнитивной способности общества, ко-
торая может освободить человека или быть эксплуатируема капитализмом. Общий 
интеллект является способностью общества к анализу, постановке целей, произ-
водства и одновременно виртуальным телом, топологически составленным соци-
альными связями «телесных сингулярностей множества». В данной статье общий 
интеллект анализируется в качестве свой ства структуры социальных связей (сое-
динений), названной здесь гетерархией. Гетерархия в качестве структуры связей 
формирует различные виды сингулярностей: агрегаты (совокупности), производи-
мые статистическими повторениями отношений, и индивидуальные эго, полагаю-
щие значения через постановку целей и другую интеллектуальную деятельность. 
Основной аргумент статьи заключается в том, что хотя в некоторой степени общий 
интеллект может обозначать способность к самоорганизации общества, его труд-
но отождествить только с одной конкретной институциональной организацией или 
политическим режимом. Общий интеллект появляется в любом виде социального 
структурирования посредством процессов самоорганизации.
Ключевые слова: общий интеллект, гетерархия, сингулярность, сложность, агре-
гат, множество, эго.
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